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Judgment-aggregation theory has always focused on the attainment of rational col-
lective judgments. But so far, rationality has been understood in static terms: as
“coherence” of judgments at a given time, understood as consistency, completeness,
and/or deductive closure. By contrast, this paper discusses whether collective judg-
ments can be dynamically rational, so that they change rationally in response to new
information. Formally, a judgment aggregation rule is dynamically rational with re-
spect to a given revision operator if, whenever all individuals revise their judgments
in light of some information (a learnt proposition), then the new aggregate judg-
ments are the old ones revised in light of this information, i.e., aggregation and
revision commute. We prove a general impossibility theorem: if the propositions
on the agenda are su ciently interconnected, no judgment aggregation rule with
standard properties is dynamically rational with respect to any revision operator
satisfying some mild conditions (familiar from belief revision theory). Our theorem
is the dynamic-rationality analogue of some well-known impossibility theorems for
static rationality. We also explore how dynamic rationality might be achieved by
relaxing some of the conditions on the aggregation rule and/or the revision operator.
1 Introduction
Suppose a group of individuals – say, a committee, expert panel, multi-member court,
or other decision-making body – makes collective judgments on some propositions by
aggregating its members’ individual judgments on those propositions. And now suppose
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the group learns some new information – in the form of the truth of some proposition
– that prompts a rational revision of the judgments held. There are two ways in which
the group might go about incorporating this new information:
Either (1) the group members individually revise their judgments based on the newly
learnt information, and the group then aggregates its members’ post-revision
judgments.
Or (2) the group first aggregates its members pre-revision judgments and then re-
vises the resulting collective judgments based on the new information.
It would be ideal if both approaches led to the same outcome: (1) revision followed by
aggregation, and (2) aggregation followed by revision. If they do, we say that aggrega-
tion and revision “commute”. In such a case, there is an alignment between “dynamic
rationality” at the individual level and its counterpart at the collective level: if the judg-
ments of all individual group members evolve across time in accordance with the given
revision method, then so do the group’s aggregated judgments. The group functions as
a dynamically rational agent through aggregating its members’ judgments.
In this paper, we investigate whether we can find reasonable aggregation rules that
enable a group to achieve such dynamic rationality: aggregation rules which commute
with reasonable revision methods. Surprisingly, this question has not been studied in the
judgment-aggregation framework where judgments are binary verdicts on some proposi-
tions: “yes”/“no”, “true”/“false”, “accept”/“reject”. (On judgment-aggregation theory,
see List and Pettit 2002, Dietrich and List 2007, Nehring and Puppe 2010, Dokow and
Holzman 2010a, List and Puppe 2009.) The focus in judgment-aggregation theory has
generally been on static rationality, namely on whether properties such as consistency,
completeness, and deductive closure are preserved when individual judgments are aggre-
gated into collective ones at a given point in time.1
By contrast, the question of dynamic rationality has received much attention in the
distinct setting of probability aggregation, where judgments aren’t binary but take the
form of subjective probability assignments to the elements of some algebra. In that
context, a mix of possibility and impossibility results has been obtained (e.g., Madan-
sky 1964, Genest 1984, Genest et al. 1986, Dietrich 2010, 2019, Russell et al. 2015).
These show that some familiar methods of aggregation – notably, the arithmetic av-
eraging of probabilities – fail to commute with belief revision, understood in broadly
1The revision of judgments has been investigated only in a di↵erent sense in judgment aggregation
theory, namely in peer-disagreement contexts, where revision is prompted not by the learning of some
new information but by the fact that others hold distinct judgments. See Pettit (2006) and List (2011).
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Bayesian terms, while other methods – particularly geometric averaging – do commute
with revision. An investigation of the parallel question in the case of binary judgments
is therefore overdue.
Our main result in this paper is, unfortunately, a negative one. We show that, for
a large class of familiar judgment aggregation rules, dynamic rationality is unachievable
relative to a large class of reasonable judgment revision methods. However, we also
show that if we relax some of our main theorem’s conditions on the aggregation rule,
dynamically rational aggregation becomes logically possible. While some of the iden-
tified possibilities are primarily technical and of limited substantive interest, we show
that so-called “premise-based” aggregation rules, which are more plausible, are in fact
dynamically rational relative to corresponding premise-based revision methods. These
are quite special, however, and come at a certain cost, and an open question for future
research is whether there might be other reasonable ways to avoid our impossibility
result.
Our results reinforce a point that has already been defended in the theory of group
agency, namely that it is di cult to achieve rational collective agency merely through the
aggregation of individual attitudes and without any sui generis deliberative processes
at the collective level itself (List and Pettit 2011). Previously, this point has been made
primarily in relation to static rationality, where impossibility results have been used to
show that rational group attitudes cannot generally supervene on rational individual
attitudes in a propositionwise manner. Our results establish a similar point in relation
to dynamic rationality. Most of our formal proofs are given in an appendix.
2 The formal setup
We begin with the basic setup from judgment aggregation theory (following List and
Pettit 2002 and Dietrich 2007). We assume that there is a set of individuals who hold
judgments on some set of propositions, and we are looking for a method of aggregating
these judgments into resulting collective judgments. The key elements of this setup are
the following:
Individuals. These are represented by a finite and non-empty set N . Its members are
labelled 1, 2, ..., n. We assume n   2.
Propositions. These are represented in formal logic. For our purposes, a thin notion
of “logic” will su ce. Specifically, a logic, L, is a non-empty set of formal objects called
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“propositions”, which is endowed with two things:
• a negation operator, denoted ¬, so that, for every proposition p in L, its negation
¬p is also in L; and
• a well-behaved notion of consistency, which specifies, for each set of propositions
S ✓ L, whether S is consistent or inconsistent.2
Standard propositional, predicate, modal, and conditional logics all fall under this defini-
tion, as do Boolean algebras.3 We call a proposition p contradictory if {p} is inconsistent,
and tautological if {¬p} is inconsistent. Any non-contradictory and non-tautological
proposition is called contingent.
Agenda. The agenda is the set of those propositions from L on which judgments are
to be made. Formally, this is a finite non-empty subset X ✓ L, which can be partitioned
into proposition-negation pairs. Sometimes it is useful to make this partition explicit.
We write Z to denote the set of all proposition-negation pairs in X, each of which is
of the form {p,¬p} or abbreviated {±p}. The elements of Z can be interpreted as the
binary issues under consideration. Then the agenda X is their disjoint union, formally
X =
S
Z2Z Z. Throughout this paper, we assume that double-negations cancel out in
agenda propositions.4 Our focus will be on agendas satisfying a non-triviality condition.
To define it, call a set of propositions minimal inconsistent if it is inconsistent but all
its proper subsets are consistent. Proposition-negation pairs of the form {p,¬p} (with p
contingent) are minimal inconsistent, and so are sets of the form {p, q,¬(p ^ q)}, where
“^” stands for logical conjunction (“and”). We call an agenda non-simple if it has
at least one minimal inconsistent subset of size greater than two. An example of a
non-simple agenda is the set X = {±p,±(p ! q),±q}, where p might be the proposition
“Current atmospheric CO
2
is above 407 ppm”, p ! q might be the proposition “If current
2
Well-behavedness is a three-part requirement: (i) any proposition-negation pair {p,¬p} is inconsis-
tent; (ii) any subset of any consistent set is still consistent; and (iii) the empty set is consistent, and any
consistent set S has a consistent superset S0 ◆ S which contains a member of every proposition-negation
pair {p,¬p}.
3Readers familiar with probability theory could take L to be a Boolean algebra on a non-empty set ⌦
of possible worlds, e.g., L = 2⌦, with negation defined as set-theoretic complementation and consistency
of a set defined as non-empty intersection. The Boolean algebra could also be an abstract rather than
set-theoretic Boolean algebra.
4To be precise, henceforth, by the negation of any proposition q 2 X we shall mean the agenda-
internal negation of q, i.e., the opposite proposition in the binary issue {p,¬p} to which q belongs. This
is logically equivalent to the ordinary negation of q and will again be denoted ¬q, for simplicity. This




is above 407 ppm, then the Arctic iceshield will melt by 2050”, and q
might be the proposition “The Arctic iceshield will melt by 2050”. The conditional p ! q
can be formalized in standard propositional logic or in a suitable logic for conditionals.
A three-member minimal inconsistent subset of this agenda is {p, p ! q,¬q}.
Judgments. Each individual’s (and subsequently the group’s) judgments on the given
propositions are represented by a judgment set, which is a subset J ✓ X, consisting of all
those propositions from X that its bearer “accepts” (e.g., a rms or judges to be true).
A judgment set J is
• complete if it contains a member of each proposition-negation pair from X, i.e.,
J \ Z 6= ; for every Z 2 Z,
• consistent if it is a consistent set in the sense of the given logic, and
• classically rational if it has both of these properties.
We write J to denote the set of all classically rational judgment sets on the agenda
X. A list of judgment sets hJ
1
, ..., Jni across the individuals in N is called a profile (of
individual judgment sets).
Aggregation rule. A (judgment) aggregation rule is a function, F , which maps each
profile hJ
1
, ..., Jni in some domain D of admissible profiles (often D = J n) to a collective
judgment set J = F (J
1
, ..., Jn). A standard example is majority rule, which is defined
as follows: for each hJ
1
, ..., Jni 2 J n,
F (J
1




A typical research question in judgment aggregation theory is whether we can find ag-
gregation rules that satisfy certain requirements of democratic responsiveness to the
individual judgments and collective rationality. Usually, the focus is on the attainment
of static rationality at the collective level, i.e., rationality of the collective judgments at
a particular point in time, especially their consistency and perhaps their completeness.
Here, by contrast, our focus will be on requirements of dynamic rationality. To introduce
these, we must first introduce the notion of judgment revision.
3 Judgment revision
The idea we wish to capture is that whenever any individual (or subsequently the group)
learns some new information, in the form of the truth of some proposition, this individual
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(or the group) must incorporate the learnt information in the judgments held – an
idea familiar from belief revision theory in the tradition of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and
Makinson (1985) (see also Rott 2001). Our central concept is that of a judgment revision
operator. This is a function which assigns to any pair (J, p) of an initial judgment set
J ✓ X and a learnt proposition p 2 X a new judgment set J |p. We can interpret
this as the revised judgment set, given p. It is convenient not to restrict the domain of
admissible inputs and outputs of a revision operator, so that it can take any logically
possible pair (J, p) as input, with J ✓ X and p 2 X, and produce any subset of X as
output. Formally, it is a function from 2X ⇥X into 2X .
We call a revision operator regular if it satisfies the following two minimal condi-
tions:
(i) it is successful, i.e., p 2 J |p for any pair (J, p), and
(ii) it is conservative, i.e., J |p = J for any pair (J, p) such that p 2 J .
Condition (i) ensures that any learnt proposition p is indeed incorporated in the post-
revision judgment set (“accept what you learn”). Condition (ii) ensures that if the
learnt proposition is already accepted, then nothing changes (“no news, no change”).
We further call a revision operator rationality-preserving if whenever J 2 J , we have
J |p 2 J for all non-contradictory propositions p 2 X.
These definitions are well-illustrated by the class of distance-based revision operators,
familiar from belief revision theory. Such operators require that when a judgment set is
revised in light of some new information, the post-revision judgments remain as “close”
as possible to the pre-revision judgments, subject to the constraint that the learnt infor-
mation be incorporated and no inconsistencies be introduced. Di↵erent distance-based
operators spell out the notion of “closeness” in di↵erent ways.
To make this precise, we first consider a distance metric on judgment sets (such
metrics have been introduced in the area of judgment aggregation by Konieczny and Pino
Pérez 2002 and Pigozzi 2006). This is a function d that assigns to any pair of judgment
sets J, J 0 ✓ X a non-negative real number d(J, J 0) interpreted as the “distance” between
J and J 0, subject to the minimal condition that d(J, J 0) = 0 if and only if J = J 0. A
simple example of a distance metric is the Hamming distance, according to which d(J, J 0)
is the number of propositions in X on which J and J 0 disagree, i.e.,
d(J, J 0) = |
 
p 2 X : p 2 J < p 2 J 0
 
|.
Now, given a distance metric d, we can define a corresponding judgment revision oper-
ator. For any (J, p), let J |p be a judgment set J 0 satisfying the following constraints:
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• J 0 contains p,
• J 0 is classically rational, except possibly when J is not classically rational or p is
contradictory,
• J 0 has minimal distance from J among those judgment sets satisfying the first two
constraints.5
By construction, any distance-based revision operator is successful (because of the first
bullet point), rationality-preserving (because of the second), and conservative (because
of the last bullet point, given our minimal condition on a distance metric). We will later
construct several other revision operators, but for the moment, the present example
should su ce as an illustration.
4 Can aggregation and revision commute?
We are now ready to turn to this paper’s question. As noted, we would ideally want any
decision-making group to employ a judgment aggregation rule and a revision operator
that generate the same collective judgments irrespective of whether revision takes place
before or after aggregation. This requirement (an analogue of the classic “external
Bayesianity” condition in probability aggregation theory, as in Madansky 1964, Genest
1984, and Genest et al. 1986) is captured by the following condition on the aggregation
rule F and the revision operator |:
Dynamic rationality. For any profile hJ
1
, ..., Jni in the domain of F and any learnt
proposition p 2 X where the revised profile hJ
1
|p, ..., Jn|pi is also in the domain of F ,
F (J
1
|p, ..., Jn|p) = F (J1, ..., Jn)|p.
To see that this condition is surprisingly hard to satisfy, consider an example. Sup-
pose a three-member group is making judgments on the agendaX = {±p,±(p ! q),±q},
where p ! q is understood as a subjunctive conditional. That is, apart from the sub-
sets of X that include a proposition-negation pair, the only inconsistent subset of X is
{p, (p ! q),¬q}.6 Suppose, further, the group members’ initial judgments are as shown
on the left-hand side Table 1, where “yes” stands for the acceptance of a proposition
and “no” for the acceptance of its negation.
5Insofar as there need not be a unique such distance-minimizing J 0, the choice of J 0 may require a
tie-breaking criterion.
6This subjunctive understanding of p ! q contrasts with the material one, where p ! q is understood
less realistically as ¬p_q. On the material understanding, the subsets {p,¬(p ! q), q}, {¬p,¬(p ! q), q},
and {¬p,¬(p ! q),¬q} would also be deemed inconsistent.
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Table 1: A simple example
Before learning p After learning p
p p ! q q p p ! q q
Individual 1 No No Yes Yes No Yes
Individual 2 No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Individual 3 No No No Yes No No
Majority No No No Yes No Yes
Suppose now that the aggegation rule is majority rule and the revision operator
is based on the Hamming distance, with some tie-breaking provision such that, in the
case of a tie, one is more ready to change one’s judgment on p or q than on p ! q.
If the individuals learn the truth of p and revise their judgments, they arrive at the
post-revision judgments shown on the right-hand side of Table 1. Aggregating those
judgments yields the collective judgment set {p,¬(p ! q), q}. By contrast, if the indi-
viduals first aggregate their pre-revision judgments, they arrive at the majority judgment
set {¬p,¬(p ! q),¬q}, and its revision in response to learning p yields the judgment set
{p,¬(p ! q),¬q}. Thus the group arrives at a di↵erent collective judgment set depend-
ing on whether aggregation precedes revision or the other way round: the combination
of majority rule and distance-based revision is not dynamically rational.
At first sight, one might think that this problem is just an artifact of majority
rule or our specific distance-based revision operator, or that it is somehow unique to our
example. However, our first formal result shows that the problem is more general. Define
a uniform quota rule, with acceptance threshold m 2 {1, 2, ..., n}, as the aggregation rule
with domain J n such that, for each hJ
1
, ..., Jni 2 J n,
F (J
1
, ..., Jn) = {p 2 X : |{i : p 2 Ji}|   m}.
Majority rule is a special case of a uniform quota rule, namely the one where m is the
smallest integer greater than n
2
. We have:
Theorem 1. If the agenda X is non-simple, then no uniform quota rule whose threshold
is not the unanimity threshold n is dynamically rational with respect to any regular
rationality-preserving revision operator.
In short, replacing majority rule with some other uniform quota rule with threshold
less than n wouldn’t solve our problem of dynamic irrationality, and neither would replac-
ing our distance-based revision operator with some other regular rationality-preserving
revision operator. In fact, the problem generalizes further, as shown in the next section.
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5 A general impossibility theorem
We will now abstract away from the details of any particular aggregation rule, and
suppose instead we are looking for an aggregation rule F that satisfies the following
general conditions:
Universal domain: The domain of admissible inputs to the aggregation rule F is the
set of all classically rational profiles, i.e., D = J n.
Non-imposition: F does not always deliver the same antecedently fixed output judg-
ment set J , irrespective of the individual inputs, i.e., F is not a constant function.
Monotonicity: Additional individual support for an accepted proposition does not
overturn the proposition’s acceptance, i.e., for any profile hJ
1
, ..., Jni 2 D and any propo-
sition p 2 F (J
1
, ..., Jn), if any Ji not containing p is replaced by some J 0i containing p
and the modified profile hJ
1
, ..., J 0i , ..., Jni remains in D, then p 2 F (J1, ..., J 0i , ..., Jn).
Non-oligarchy: There is no non-empty set of individuals M ✓ N (a set of “oligarchs”)
such that, for every profile hJ
1
, ..., Jni 2 D, F (J1, ..., Jn) = \i2MJi.
Systematicity: The collective judgment on each proposition is determined fully and
neutrally by individual judgments on that proposition. Formally, for any propositions
p, p0 2 X and any profiles hJ
1
, ..., Jni , hJ 0
1
, ..., J 0ni 2 D, if, for all i 2 N , p 2 Ji , p0 2 J 0i ,
then p 2 J , p0 2 J 0, where J = F (J
1
, ..., Jn) and J 0 = F (J 0
1
, ..., J 0n).
Why are these conditions initially plausible? The reason is that, for each of them,
a violation would entail a cost. Violating universal domain would mean that the aggre-
gation rule is not fully robust to pluralism in its inputs; it would be undefined for some
classically rational judgment profiles. Violating non-imposition would mean that the
collective judgments are totally unresponsive to the individual judgments, which is com-
pletely undemocratic. Violating monotonicity could make the aggregation rule erratic
in some respect: an individual could come to accept a particular collectively accepted
proposition and thereby overturn its acceptance. Violating non-oligarchy would mean
two things. First, the collective judgments would depend only on the judgments of the
“oligarchs”, which is undemocratic when M 6= N ; and second, the collective judgments
would be incomplete with respect to any binary issue on which there is the slightest
disagreement among the oligarchs, which would lead to widespread indecision, except
when M is singleton. Important special cases of oligarchic rules are dictatorships of
one individual (where M is singleton) and unanimity rule (where M = N). Violating
systemacity, finally, would mean that the collective judgment on each proposition is no
longer determined as a proposition-independent function of individual judgments on that
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proposition. It may then either depend on individual judgments on other propositions
too (a lack of propositionwise independence), or the pattern of dependence may vary
from proposition to proposition (a lack of neutrality). Systematicity – the conjunction
of propositionwise independence and neutrality – is the most controversial condition
among the five. But it’s worth noting that it is satisfied by majority rule and all uniform
quota rules. Indeed, majority rule and uniform quota rules (except the unanimity rule)
satisfy all five conditions.
Our main theorem shows that, for non-simple agendas, the present five conditions
are incompatible with dynamic rationality:
Theorem 2. If the agendaX is non-simple, then no aggregation rule satisfying universal
domain, non-imposition, monotonicity, non-oligarchy, and systematicity is dynamically
rational with respect to any regular rationality-preserving revision operator.
So, the problem identified by Theorem 1 is not restricted to uniform quota rules, but
extends to all aggregation rules satisfying our conditions. Moreover, since practically
all non-trivial agendas are non-simple, the impossibility applies very widely. In the
next section, we show that all of the theorem’s conditions – not only the ones on the
aggregation rule but also the one on the agenda – are needed for the present impossibility
result, i.e., the impossibility ceases to hold if any one of these conditions is dropped.
6 Non-redundancy of the conditions
We will first run through the five conditions on the aggregation rule and show that, for
each of them, there exist aggregation rules on some non-simple agendas which satisfy
all of our conditions except the given one, while being dynamically rational with respect
to some regular rationality-preserving revision operators. Importantly, many of these
examples are relatively contrived and thus more of theoretical rather than practical
interest. We will then show that the theorem’s condition on the agenda – non-simplicity
– is needed for the impossibility too. Thus we could amend the theorem’s antecedent
clause by writing “If, and only if, the agenda X is non-simple”.
6.1 Possibilities without universal domain
To see that Theorem 2 would fail to hold without the condition of universal domain,
we take any non-simple agenda X and construct two non-trivial examples of restricted
domains D ✓ J n on which majority rule is dynamically rational with respect to some
regular rationality-preserving revision operator. Since majority rule clearly satisfies the
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rest of our conditions (non-imposition, monotonicity, non-oligarchy, and systematicity),
the examples establish our point.





, ..., Jni 2 J n : | {i 2 N : Ji = J} | >
n
2
for some J 2 J
o
,
i.e., D consists of all rational judgment profiles in which a majority of individuals hold
the same judgment set. It is easy to verify that, whenever a profile hJ
1
, ..., Jni is in
D, then the revised profile hJ
1
|p, ..., Jn|pi is still in D, for any non-contradictory propo-
sition p 2 X and any regular rationality-preserving revision operator. Moreover, if F
is majority rule on D, then F (J
1
, ..., Jn) is simply the judgment set J held by a ma-
jority of individuals in hJ
1
, ..., Jni, so that F (J1, ..., Jn)|p = J |p. The revised profile
hJ
1
|p, ..., Jn|pi has the property that the majority of individuals who previously held the
judgment set J come to hold the judgment set J |p, so that the latter is also the majority
outcome. Hence F (J
1
|p, ..., Jn|p) = F (J1, ..., Jn)|p, as required.
Our second example invokes the idea that the propositions in X can be ordered
from “left” to “right” on some cognitive or ideological dimension, in such a way that all
individuals’ judgments are structured by that order. Specifically, consider a linear order
 on X, where, for any two propositions p, q 2 X, p  q means that “p is (weakly) to
the left of q”. We call a profile hJ
1
, ..., Jni single-plateaued relative to  if, for every
individual i 2 N ,
Ji = {p2X : pleft  p  pright} for some pleft, pright2 X,
i.e., the individual’s judgment set forms a connected interval (a “plateau” of accepted




. It is already known that
single-plateauedness, combined with individual-level consistency, is su cient for consis-
tent majority judgments (Dietrich and List 2010). To explain how single-plateauedness
can also help with dynamic rationality, let J denote the subset of J consisting of
all classically rational judgment sets that are single-plateaued relative to . Define a
judgment revision operator as follows: for any pair (J, p),
• if J 2 J and J contains at least one judgment set containing p, let J |p be
the (unique) judgment set J 0 2 J containing p whose Hamming distance from
J is minimal (so that judgment revision simply shifts the plateau of accepted
propositions minimally until it contains p while remaining classically rational);
• otherwise, let J |p be any judgment set J 0 ✓ X containing p whose Hamming
distance from J is minimal, subject to the constraint that if J 2 J and p is
non-contradictory, then J 0 2 J .
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One can now show that, on the domain D = J n , majority rule (in a group N with
odd-numbered size n) is dynamically rational with respect to the revision operator
just defined. The reason is that whenever a classically rational profile hJ
1
, ..., Jni is
single-plateaued relative to , the majority judgments will coincide with the individual
judgments of a particular profile-specific individual (technically, the median individual
relative to some left-right order of the individuals that can be suitably constructed for
the given profile), and even if all individuals revise their judgments based on learning a
proposition p in line with the first bullet point, the majority judgments will still coincide
with the revised judgments of that same individual. Details are given in the appendix.
6.2 Possibilities without non-imposition
To see that Theorem 2 would fail to hold without the condition of non-imposition, we
take any non-simple agenda X and any regular rationality-preserving revision operator,
and note that the following, rather absurd aggregation rule is dynamically rational while
satisfying the rest of our conditions: for any profile hJ
1
, ..., Jni 2 J n,
F (J
1
, ..., Jn) = X,
i.e., the collective judgment set is always identical to the agenda in its entirety. Of
course, this aggregation rule is completely unresponsive to the individual judgments and
produces totally inconsistent collective judgments. Nonetheless, it satisfies universal
domain, monotonicity, non-oligarchy, and systematicity, while also satisfying dynamic
rationality. (Note that, for any regular revision operator and any proposition p, X|p =
X.) Let’s call this aggregation rule the absurd rule.
One might wonder whether there are any less absurd examples of dynamically ratio-
nal aggregation rules when we drop non-imposition. In fact, there are none. Our proof
of Theorem 2 shows that, for any non-simple agenda X and any regular rationality-
preserving revision operator, the absurd rule is the unique dynamically rational aggre-
gation rule satisfying the rest of our conditions. Thus Theorem 2 would continue to
hold if we were to replace non-imposition with the requirement that the aggregation rule
should not be the absurd rule.
6.3 Possibilities without monotonicity
To see that Theorem 2 would fail to hold without the condition of monotonicity, we
show that, for some non-simple agendas, one can construct non-monotonic aggregation
rules that are dynamically rational with respect to some regular rationality-preserving
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revision operator, while satisfying the rest of our conditions. Specifically, we consider a
non-simple agenda X with the following properties:
• X is a ne, in the sense that every minimal inconsistent subset Y ✓ X remains
inconsistent after negating any two (or any even number) of its members.7
• For each contingent proposition p 2 X, there exists a subagenda Xp (a non-empty
subset of X closed under negation) which contains p and shares an even number
of propositions with any minimal inconsistent subset of Y ✓ X, i.e., |Y \ Xp| 2
{0, 2, 4, 6, ...}.
An example of such an agenda is X = {±p,±q,±(p $ q)}, where p and q are logically
independent and $ is the material biconditional. This agenda is clearly non-simple. To
see that it is a ne, note that its minimal inconsistent subsets, besides all proposition-
negation pairs, are {¬p, q, p $ q}, {p,¬q, p $ q}, {p, q,¬(p $ q)}, {¬p,¬q,¬(p $ q)}.
Negating any two members of any one of these sets yields another one of them. Fur-
thermore, for each p 2 X, we can take Xp to be any subagenda of X that includes {±p}
and exactly one other proposition-negation pair. Then Xp shares an even number of
propositions with any minimal inconsistent subset of X.











J if p 2 J,
(Xp\J) [ (J\Xp) if p /2 J and J 2 J ,
any judgment set containing p if p /2 J and J /2 J ,
where Xp is the above-defined subagenda if p is contingent and is {±p} if p is non-
contingent. Although this revision operator is admittedly a bit contrived, one can verify
that it is both regular and rationality-preserving (details are in the appendix). It now
turns out that an even more contrived kind of aggregation rule – a so-called parity rule
(as introduced by Dokow and Holzman 2010a) – is dynamically rational with respect
to this revision operator, while satisfying all of our conditions except monotonicity. To
define it, let M be any odd-sized subset of N , and for any profile hJ
1
, ..., Jni 2 J n, let
F (J
1
, ..., Jn) = {p 2 X : | {i 2 M : p 2 Ji} | is odd} ,
7The negation of a ness is non-a neness or pair-negatability, which is the condition that X has
at least one minimal inconsistent subset Y in which we can find two (or an even number of) distinct
propositions whose negation renders Y consistent. The name “a neness” is due to Dokow and Holzman
(2010a), who introduced this condition in an explicitly algebraic form.
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i.e., the set of collectively accepted propositions consists of all propositions that are
accepted precisely by an odd number of individuals in M . Clearly, this aggregation rule
is non-monotonic. However, we show in the appendix that, for any agenda of the specified
kind – such as X = {±p,±q,±(p $ q)} – the present aggregation rule is dynamically
rational with respect to the revision operator just defined. Furthermore, a parity rule
satisfies universal domain, non-imposition, systematicity, and non-oligarchy (assuming
|M |   3). To be sure, this possibility is of no substantive interest and only illustrates
the mathematical point that the monotonicity condition is needed in Theorem 2.
6.4 Possibilities without non-oligarchy
To see that Theorem 2 would fail to hold without the condition of non-oligarchy, we give
two examples of oligarchic aggregation rules that are dynamically rational with respect
to some (or even any) regular rationality-preserving revision operator for some (or even
any) non-simple agenda. These examples su ce to illustrate the non-redundancy of the
non-oligarchy condition in our theorem because oligarchic rules always satisfy universal
domain, non-imposition, monotonicity, and systematicity. Recall that an oligarchy (as
discussed by Gärdenfors 2006, Dietrich and List 2008, and Dokow and Holzman 2010b)
is defined by fixing some non-empty set M ✓ N of individuals (the “oligarchs”) such
that, for every profile hJ
1
, ..., Jni 2 J n, we have
F (J
1
, ..., Jn) = \i2MJi.
Our first example is a trivial one, namely a dictatorship of one individual; here
the set of oligarchs is singleton, i.e., M = {i} for some fixed i 2 N . Clearly, if we
have F (J
1
, ..., Jn) = Ji for every profile hJ1, ..., Jni 2 J n, then it trivially follows that
F (J
1
|p, ..., Jn|p) = F (J1, ..., Jn)|p, irrespective of the agendaX and the revision operator.
For a less trivial example, which permits more than one oligarch, consider an agenda

































i.e., the set of all complete subsets of X in which an even number of propositions (either
zero or two) is negated. Such an agenda is non-simple: a minimal inconsistent subset of






}. An example is once again X = {±p,±q,±(p $ q)},
where p and q are logically independent and $ is the material biconditional. Now we
first define a regular rationality-preserving judgment revision operator for X, and we
then show that any oligarchic aggregation-rule is dynamically rational with respect to
it.
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To construct the desired revision operator, we start from an assignment of a revised
judgment set Jp 2 J for every pair (J, p), where J 2 J and p 2 X. We construct this
assignment such that
• for any p 2 X and any J 2 J , if p 2 J , then Jp = J , and
• for any p 2 X and any J, J 0 2 J , if J and J 0 are distinct and do not not contain
p (i.e., they are the two distinct judgment sets in J containing ¬p), then Jp and
J 0p are distinct and contain p (i.e., they are the two distinct judgment sets in J
containing p).
These properties jointly imply that Jp 2 J and p 2 Jp. We can think of the assignment
of a judgment set Jp to each pair (J, p) as the restriction of the desired judgment revision
operator to the domain J ⇥ X. Our goal is to extend this operator to all pairs (J, p)
with J ✓ X and p 2 X.
For the purposes of our example, we fully define the revision operator for all pairs
(J, p) where J belongs to the set J + of all consistent and deductively closed subsets of
X (a superset of J ). For all other pairs, the operator can be defined arbitrarily, subject
only to the restrictions of regularity (i.e., p 2 J |p, and if p 2 J then J |p = J). Now, for
any pair (J, p) with J 2 J + and p 2 X, we define
J |p =
\
J 02J :J✓J 0
J 0p,
i.e., J |p is the intersection of all revised judgment sets of the form J 0p, where J 0 is a
complete and consistent extension of J . To give an intuition for this definition, note
that any consistent and deductively closed judgment set J can be expressed as the
intersection of all its complete and consistent extensions J 0 ◆ J . So, our definition says
that J is revised by revising all its complete and consistent extensions and taking the
intersection of the revised judgment sets. As a special case of this, we have J |p = Jp
whenever J is complete and consistent.
This completes the definition of our revision operator. Note that this operator is
rationality-preserving and regular. It is rationality-preserving because, for any J 2 J ,
we have J |p = Jp, and the latter is in J . It is successful – the first part of regularity –
because, for any J 2 J + and any p 2 X, the revised judgment set J |p is the intersection
of sets of the form J 0p, which each contain p, so that J |p also contains p. Moreover, for
any J /2 J +, J |p contains p by stipulation.
The operator is conservative – the second part of regularity – because, for any J 2 J +
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and any p 2 J , we have
J |p =
\
J 02J :J✓J 0
J 0p =
\
J 02J :J✓J 0
J 0 = J.
The first identity holds by the definition of the revision operator. The second identity
holds because we have J 0p = J
0 whenever p 2 J 0. The third identity holds because J ,
being consistent and deductively closed, is identical to the intersection of all its complete
and consistent extensions. Once again, for any J /2 J +, conservativeness (if p 2 J then
J |p = J) holds by stipulation.
In the appendix we prove that, on the given non-simple agenda X, every oligarchic
aggregation rule is dynamically rational with respect to the constructed revision oper-
ator. Let F be any oligarchic aggregation rule with the set M ✓ N of oligarchs. Our
proof establishes that, for every hJ
1
, ..., Jni 2 J n and every p 2 X,
F (J
1
, ..., Jn)|p = F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p),
i.e.,
(\i2MJi) |p = \i2M (Ji|p). (1)
To give an intuition for this result, we briefly explain why the judgment set on the
left-hand side of identity (1) is included in the judgment set on the right-hand side. The
converse inclusion is harder to show, and we refer the reader to the appendix for the full
proof. We begin by noting that \i2MJi is consistent and deductively closed, being the
intersection of several consistent and complete judgment sets. Therefore, the definition
of our revision operator allows us to rewrite the judgment set on the left-hand side of
identity (1) as follows:
(\i2MJi) |p =
\
J 02J :(\i2MJi)✓J 0
J 0p.
Further, the judgment set on the right-hand side of identity (1), \i2M (Ji|p), can be




Since each Ji is a complete and consistent extension of the intersection \i2MJi, expres-
sion (2) includes
\
J 02J :(\i2MJi)✓J 0
J 0p, (3)
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because expression (3) is simply an intersection of more sets than expression (2): the
sets being intersected in (3) include all those being intersected in (2). This establishes
that
(\i2MJi) |p ✓ \i2M (Ji|p),
as desired. As noted, in the appendix, we show that the two judgment sets are in fact
identical.
6.5 Possibilities without systematicity
To see that Theorem 2 would fail to hold without the condition of systematicity, we show
that, for some non-simple agendas, one can construct aggregation rules which satisfy all
of our conditions except systematicity and are dynamically rational with respect to some
regular rationality-preserving revision operator. Specifically, we consider an agenda X
of the form X = {±p : p 2 Y }, where Y is the only minimal inconsistent subset of X
apart from the proposition negation pairs {p,¬p} ✓ X and where Y has three or more
elements. An example is the earlier agenda X = {±p,±(p ! q),±q}, where p ! q is
a subjunctive conditional, so that the only minimal inconsistent subsets of X are the












J if p 2 J,
{p} [ (J\ {¬p}) if p /2 J and p /2 Y,
{p} [ {¬q : q 2 Y \ {p}} if p /2 J and p 2 Y.
It is easy to see that this revision operator is regular. To see that it is also rationality-
preserving, take any J 2 J and any p 2 X. (In the present agenda, all propositions are
non-contradictory.) The revised judgment set J |p is complete because J itself is complete
and Y contains a member of every proposition-negation pair {p,¬p} ✓ X. Furthermore,
J |p is consistent because it includes neither Y itself nor any proposition-negation pair
{p,¬p} ✓ X, and so it includes no minimal inconsistent set.
We now show that the following aggregation rule is dynamically rational with respect
to this revision operator. For any profile hJ
1
, ..., Jni 2 J n, let F (J1, ..., Jn) consist of
• all p 2 Y such that every Ji contains p, and
• all p 2 X\Y such that at least one Ji contains p.
We can think of this aggregation rule as an asymmetric unanimity rule. Propositions in
Y are collectively accepted if and only if they are unanimously accepted, while proposi-
tions outside Y are collectively accepted if and only if they are not unanimously rejected.
17
It is evident that this aggregation rule satisfies universal domain, non-imposition, mono-
tonicity, and non-oligarchy. It is also evident that it violates systematicity: the collective
acceptance criterion is not the same for all propositions (a lack of neutrality). To see
that it is dynamically rational with respect to the constructed revision operator, we
distinguish between three cases.
• Case 1 : p 2 Y and p 2 Ji for all i 2 N . Then p 2 F (J1, ..., Jn). Because the
revision operator is conservative, Ji|p = Ji for every i 2 N and F (J1, ..., Jn)|p =
F (J
1
, ..., Jn). So, F (J1, ..., Jn)|p = F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p).
• Case 2 : p 2 Y and p /2 Ji for some i 2 N . Then Ji|p = {p} [ {¬q : q 2 Y \ {p}}.
This means that, in the profile hJ
1
|p, ..., Jn|pi, p is unanimously accepted (because
the revision operator is conservative), while all propositions outside Y (namely,
those in {¬q : q 2 Y \ {p}}) are accepted by at least one individual (namely, in-
dividual i). So, F (J
1
|p, ..., Jn|p) = {p} [ {¬q : q 2 Y \ {p}}. Meanwhile, since
p 2 Y and p is not unanimously accepted in the profile hJ
1
, ..., Jni, we have
p /2 F (J
1
, ..., Jn), and so F (J1, ..., Jn)|p = {p} [ {¬q : q 2 Y \ {p}}. This shows
that F (J
1
, ..., Jn)|p = F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p).
• Case 3 : p /2 Y . Here, revision of any judgment set simply leads to the accep-
tance of p and the non-acceptance of ¬p, while nothing else changes. So, the
profile hJ
1
|p, ..., Jn|pi displays unanimous acceptance of p and coincides with the
profile hJ
1
, ..., Jni on all proposition-negation pairs distinct from {p,¬p}. Then
F (J
1
|p, ..., Jn|p) contains p and coincides with F (J1, ..., Jn) on all other proposition-
negation pairs. Furthermore, F (J
1
, ..., Jn)|p also contains p and concides with
F (J
1




At the end of the paper, we consider another class of aggregation rules violating sys-
tematicity which o↵er an escape route from our impossibility result, though that route
requires relaxing some of our conditions on the revision operator too.
6.6 Possibilities for simple agenads
We have seen that all of Theorem 2’s conditions on the aggregation rule are needed for
the impossibility result. We now turn to the theorem’s condition on the agenda. Recall
that the theorem asserts that the impossibility arises if the agenda is non-simple: it
has at least one minimal inconsistent subset with more than two propositions. We will
show that, if the agenda is simple, there exist aggregation rules that satisfy the required
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conditions while being dynamically rational with respect to a natural kind of revision
operator.
Consider any simple agenda X. Let the revision operator be as follows. For any
J ✓ X and any p 2 X,





q if {q, p} is consistent,
¬q otherwise;
• if J /2 J , then J |p can be defined arbitrarily, subject to the regularity conditions
that (i) p 2 J |p and (ii) if p 2 J , then J |p = J .
By definition, this operator is regular, and since X is simple, it can also be seen to be
rationality-preserving. Moreover, the operator has the special feature of being local : the
revised judgment on any proposition q 2 X depends only on the initial judgment on q
and on the learnt proposition p.8 The following result holds:
Proposition 1. If the agenda X is simple, then every aggregation rule satisfying uni-
versal domain, collective rationality, propositionwise independence (or systematicity),
and unanimity preservation is dynamically rational with respect to the revision operator
just defined.
Here universal domain is as before; collective rationality is the requirement that
F (J
1
, ..., Jn) 2 J for every profile hJ1, ..., Jni 2 D; propositionwise independence is
a weakened version of systematicity, where the quantification is restricted to pairs of
propositions p, p0 with p = p0; and unanimity preservation is the requirement that
F (J, ..., J) = J for every unanimous profile hJ, ..., Ji 2 D. Unanimity preservation
strengthens non-imposition. An example of an aggregation rule satisfying all of these
conditions (if X is simple and n is odd) is majority rule, which of course also satisfies
all of the conditions of Theorem 2.
This shows that non-simplicity of the agenda is not only su cient for our impossi-
bility result, but also necessary. In fact, this is true not just in the case of Theorem 2,
but also in the case of Theorem 1.
8The present definition has the interesting implication that, for a simple agenda X, if the initial
judgment set J is classically rational and the learnt proposition p is non-contradictory, then J |p is
the unique classically rational judgment set that minimizes the Hamming distance from J subject to
containing p. For general agendas, revision by minimizing Hamming distance is neither unique, nor local.
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7 Premise-based revision and aggregation
The possibilities of dynamically rational aggregation we have considered in response to
Theorem 2 have mostly served to prove the technical point that none of the theorem’s
conditions is redundant. We conclude by considering a possibly more interesting escape
route from our impossibility result, which works for non-simple agendas and involves
relaxing not only some of the conditions on the aggregation rule but also some of those on
the revision operator. Specifically, we will show that so-called premise-based aggregation
rules – the best-known aggregation rules giving up systematicity – are dynamically
rational if revision is defined in a corresponding premise-based way. The cost of this,
however, is a relaxation of our regularity conditions on revision itself.
Let us begin by introducing the idea of premise-based aggregation (for earlier defini-
tions related to the present one, see List and Pettit 2002, Dietrich 2006, and Dietrich and
Mongin 2009; for other discussions, see Kornhauser and Sager 1986, Pettit 2001, Chap-
man 2002, and Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006). Suppose the agenda X can be partitioned
into a subagenda of premises and a subagenda of conclusions. Formally, we represent
this partition by partitioning the set Z of binary issues into a set Z
prem
of “premise
issues” and a set Z
conc











Z. As an illustration, consider
again the agenda X = {±p,±(p ! q),±q}. Here, the premise issues might be {±p} and
{±(p ! q)}, and the conclusion issue might be {±q}. The intuition is that the former
might somehow be more fundamental than the latter, so that an agent’s judgments on
the latter may be derived from the agent’s judgments on the former.
To define a premise-based aggregation rule, we require two preliminary definitions.
For each premise issue Z 2 Z
prem
, we introduce a local aggregation rule (“premise aggre-
gator”) FZ which assigns to each combination of individual judgments on Z a collective
judgment on Z. Formally, FZ is a function from J nZ to JZ , where JZ is the set of all
locally complete and consistent judgments on Z, i.e., JZ = {{p} , {¬p}} for the binary
issue Z = {±p}, assuming p is contingent. In the classical premise-based aggregation
rule, each FZ is majority rule, if n is odd.
To derive the judgments on all conclusion issues, we employ a consequence rule,
defined as a function Cn that assigns to each set of (already accepted) propositions
J ✓ X another set Cn(J) ✓ X of propositions that are the “consequences” of J . In the
classical case, Cn(J) simply consists of all propositions p in X that are logically entailed
by J in the sense that the negation of p is inconsistent with J .
For any profile of individual judgment sets, we now arrive at the overall collective
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judgment set by
• first aggregating the individual judgments on all the premises, using the given local
aggregation rules, and
• then deriving their consequences for all other propositions, using the given conse-
quence rule.
Formally, we define our premise-based aggregation rule on the domain of all profiles of
judgment sets J ✓ X that are classically rational on the premises, i.e., J \ Z 2 JZ for
all Z 2 Z
prem
. Let Ĵ be the set of all such judgment sets. (This is a superset of J .)
For any profile hJ
1
, ..., Jni 2 Ĵ n, we let
F (J
1
















JZ0) \ Z if Z 2 Zconc.
To illustrate this definition, consider the agenda X = {±p,±(p ! q),±q} with {±p}
and {±(p ! q)} designated as the premise issues, and suppose the individual judgments
are as shown in Table 2. If the premise-based rule is the classical one, where each premise
aggregator FZ is the majority rule and the consequence rule Cn is the classical one,
the collective judgment set will be {p, p ! q, q}. Propositions p and p ! q will each be
accepted by aggregating the individual judgments on those propositions, and proposition
q will be accepted by logical inference. It is evident that this aggregation rule violates
systematicity, by treating premises and conclusions di↵erently and also by determining
the collective judgments on all conclusions in a non-propositionwise-independent way.
Table 2: A premise-based rule illustrated
p p ! q q
Individual 1 Yes Yes Yes
Individual 2 Yes No No
Individual 3 No Yes No
Premise-based rule Yes Yes Yes
Next we introduce the idea of premise-based revision. Here, we also need some
preliminary definitions. For each premise issue Z 2 Z
prem
, we introduce a local revision
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operator (“premise revisor”), denoted |Z , just for that issue. Formally, this is a function
(from 2Z ⇥ X into 2Z) which assigns to any pair (L, p) of an initial local judgment L
on issue Z (formally L ✓ Z) and a learnt proposition p 2 X a new local judgment on
issue Z, denoted L|Zp. As issue Z is of the form {±p}, any local judgment on Z must
be of the form ;, {p} , {¬p} , {p,¬p}. Of these, the first would correspond to withholding
judgment on Z, the last would be inconsistent, and only the middle two would encode
a locally complete and consistent judgment on issue Z (assuming neither p nor ¬p is
contradictory). To derive the revised judgments on all conclusion issues, we employ
again our consequence rule Cn, which allows us to assign to each set of (already revised)
propositions J ✓ X the set of propositions that are its consequences, Cn(J) ✓ X.
For any initial judgment set and any newly learnt proposition, the premise-based
revision operator now arrives at the revised judgment set by
• first revising the judgments on all the premises, using the given local revision
operators, and
• then deriving their consequences for all other propositions, using the given conse-
quence rule.
Formally, for any initial judgment set J ✓ X and any learnt proposition p 2 X, the

















JZ0) \ Z if Z 2 Zconc.
The premise-based revision operator is often neither regular nor rationality-preserving,
as defined earlier, but any plausible premise-based revision operator satisfies weaker ver-
sions of these conditions. In particular, it satisfies regularity on premises, in the sense
that it satisfies our two regularity conditions, successfulness and conservativeness, re-
stricted to the premises. Successfulness on premises means that p 2 J |p whenever
p 2 X
prem
, and conservativeness on premises means that if p 2 J \ X
prem
, then J
and J |p coincide on the premises, i.e., J \ X
prem
= (J |p) \ X
prem
. The first of these
properties permits that one does not incorporate a newly learnt conclusion proposition
in one’s revised judgments; rather, one always builds up one’s revised judgments from
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one’s judgments on the premises. And the second property permits that if one learns
– or is reminded of – an already known premise, one might still change one’s judg-
ments on some conclusion, for instance by recognizing certain hitherto unacknowledged
consequences of one’s existing premise judgments. The premise-based revision operator
may fail to be rationality-preserving insofar as a complete and consistent pre-revision
judgment set does not always guarantee a complete and consistent post-revision judg-
ment set. Whether or not it does depends very much on the nature of the subagenda of
premises and the nature of the consequence rule. If consequence is defined classically, for
instance, then the completeness of the revised judgments depends on whether complete
judgments on the premises always logically settle all conclusion propositions; and if the
premise issues are logically dependent, then the consistency of the revised judgments
may be threatened by the fact that premise-based revision operates independently on
each premise issue.
We are now in a position to state our possibility result. Call a revision operator
idempotent if (J |p)|p = J |p for all J ✓ X and all p 2 X (“learning the same information
again does not change one’s judgments”). Idempotence is much less demanding than
full-blown regularity.
Theorem 3. If the revision operator is premise-based and idempotent, then all premise-
based aggregation rules with unanimity-preserving premise aggregators (and with the
same premises and consequence rule as in revision) are dynamically rational.
Here, a premise aggregator FZ is unanimity-preserving if F (L, ..., L) = L for any unan-
imous local judgment profile (L, ..., L) on the premise issue Z (i.e., L ✓ Z).
In fact, we can go beyond Theorem 3 and show that, in important special cases,
premise-based rules are the only dynamically rational aggregation rules with respect to
a premise-based revision operator. To state this uniqueness result, we need to introduce
two other conditions on the aggregation rule, which replace our original monotonicity
and systematicity conditions, neither of which is generally satisfied by a premise-based
rule. The first condition is a global version of monotonicity which replaces the focus on
accepted propositions with a focus on accepted judgment sets:
Global monotonicity: Additional individual support for a “winning” judgment set
does not overturn the outcome, i.e., if any profile hJ
1
, ..., Jni 2 D is modified into another
profile hJ
1
, ..., J, ..., Jni 2 D by replacing one of the Jis with J = F (J1, ..., Jn), then
F (J
1
, ..., J, ..., Jn) = J .
To state the second condition, note that any given subagenda of premises X
prem
induces a relevance relation between propositions: premises are relevant to conclusions,
23
but not vice versa. More precisely, the only proposition relevant to any premise p 2 X
prem
is p itself, while the propositions relevant to any conclusion p 2 X
conc
are all premises.










if p 2 X
conc
.
Now our condition that replaces systematicity is the following (Dietrich 2015):
Independence of irrelevant propositions: The collective judgment on each propo-
sition depends only on individual judgments on relevant propositions. Formally, for
any proposition p 2 X and any profiles hJ
1
, ..., Jni , hJ 0
1
, ..., J 0ni 2 D, if, for all i 2 N ,
Ji \ R(p) = J 0i \ R(p), then p 2 J , p 2 J 0, where J = F (J1, ..., Jn) and J 0 =
F (J 0
1
, ..., J 0n).
Global monotonicity and independence of irrelevant propositions jointly weaken the
conjunction of monotonicity and systematicity used in our impossibility theorem. Here
is the uniqueness theorem:
Theorem 4. If the revision operator is premise-based, idempotent, and regular on
premises, then the premise-based aggregation rules with unanimity-preserving premise
aggregators (and with the same premises and consequence rule as in revision) are the
only dynamically rational aggregation rules F from Ĵ n into Ĵ satisfying independence
of irrelevant propositions and global monotonicity.
Insofar as premise-based judgment aggregation has been prominently discussed in the
literature, the present possibility and uniqueness results should be interesting. Indeed,
Theorem 4’s conditions on the aggregation rule seem eminently reasonable. In par-
ticular, independence of irrelevant propositions is arguably much more plausible than
systematicity, and global monotonicity is a very plausible condition too. The conditions
on the revision operator – idempotence and regularity on premises – are reasonable as
well. However, the cost of the present possibility, as we have already noted, is that the
revision operator is not generally fully regular or rationality-preserving. We leave it an
open question for further discussion whether this cost is worth bearing.
To conclude, the lesson of this paper is that it is surprisingly di cult to achieve
rationality at the collective level merely through the aggregation of individual attitudes.
While this point is well known in the case of static rationality, our results are the first in
the present judgment-aggregation framework to extend the point to dynamic rationality.
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A Proof of both impossibility theorems
A.1 Theorem 1
We first prove Theorem 1. One could easily prove Theorem 1 as a corollary of Theorem 2,
but we here provide a direct, self-contained proof. The proof begins with a lemma. Recall
that an aggregation rule F preserves unanimity if F (J, ..., J) = J for all unanimous
profiles hJ, ..., Ji in its domain. A judgment set is weakly consistent if it contains no pair
p,¬p 2 X (i.e., is not ‘drastically inconsistent’). An aggregation rule F guarantees some
condition on judgment sets (e.g., weak consistency) if F (J1, ..., Jn) satisfies the condition
for each profile hJ1, ..., Jni in the domain.
Lemma 1 If a unanimity-preserving systematic aggregation rule with universal domain
(e.g., a uniform quota rule) is dynamically rational with respect to a regular rationality-
preserving revision operator, then it guarantees weak consistency.
Proof. Let F be as specified. We may assume without loss of generality that X contains
a contingent proposition; otherwise there would exist only one (unanimous) profile in
J n, and weak consistency would follow from unanimity preservation.
Consider a profile hJ1, ..., Jni 2 J n and a p 2 F (J1, ..., Jn). We show that ¬p 62
F (J1, ..., Jn). By assumption, there is a contingent q 2 X. As ¬q is non-contradictory,
some J 2 J contains ¬q. Meanwhile q 2 J |q by successfulness, and J |q 2 J by
rationality-preservation and q’s consistency. Construct the profile hJ 01, ..., J
0




J |q if p 2 Ji
J if p 62 Ji.
Note that, for all individuals i, p 2 Ji , q 2 J 0i , or equivalently, ¬p 2 Ji , ¬q 2





preservation, hJ 01|q, ..., J
0
n|qi 2 J n. So, by dynamic rationality, F (J 01|q, ..., J
0
n|q) =
F (J 01, ..., J
0
n)|q. In this equation, the left side equals F (J |q, ..., J |q) (because (J |q)|q =
J |q by regularity), which in turn equals J |p by unanimity preservation; and the right
side equals F (J 01, ..., J
0
n), by conservativeness and the fact that q 2 F (J 01, ..., J
0
n). So,
J |q = F (J 01, ..., J
0
n). Hence, ¬q 62 F (J 01, ..., J
0
n). !
Proof of Theorem 1. LetX be non-simple; so we may pick a minimal inconsistent set Y ⊆
X with |Y | ≥ 3. Let F be a uniform quota rule on J n with some acceptance threshold
m < n. Fix a regular rationality-preserving revision operator. For a contradiction,
assume F is dynamically rational. Then, by Lemma 1, F guarantees weak consistency;
so m > n2 .
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For each y 2 Y , fix a rational judgment set J¬y 2 J such that Y \{y} ⊆ J¬y. Pick
a p 2 Y . Since J¬p|p cannot contain all y 2 Y (as revision preserves rationality) but
contains p (as revision is successful), there is some q 2 Y \{p} such that q 62 J¬p|p. As
|Y | ≥ 3, we may pick a third proposition r 2 Y \{p, q}.
Let hJ1, ..., Jni 2 J n be a profile in which some n −m individuals i hold Ji = J¬p,
other n−m individuals i hold Ji = J¬q, and all remaining individuals i hold Ji = J¬r.
As p and q are each accepted by m individuals, p, q 2 F (J1, ..., Jn). Consider the
revised profile hJ1|p, ..., Jn|pi. As q 62 J¬p|p, and as by regularity J¬q|p = J¬q and
J¬r|p = J¬r, in the new profile only the individuals who used to hold J¬r accept q; so
q is accepted by n − 2(n − m) = 2m − n < m individuals. So q 62 F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p).
Now, F (J1, ..., Jn) equals F (J1, ..., Jn)|p because it contains p and revision is regular,
and di§ers from F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) because it contains q while F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) does not.
Therefore F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) 6= F (J1, ..., Jn)|p. !
A.2 Theorem 2
We now prove Theorem 2, in a slightly stronger version that weakens the (already weak)
condition of non-imposition to non-absurdity. Non-imposition forbids that the collec-
tive judgment set is always the same. Non-absurdity merely forbids that the collective
judgment set is always the entire agenda X (an absurd judgment set).
The proof of Theorem 2 uses again Lemma 1, but it also uses the following additional
lemma.
Lemma 2 The aggregation conditions in Theorem 2 with non-imposition weakened to
non-absurdity (and with dynamic rationality defined with respect to a regular rationality-
preserving revision operator) imply unanimity-preservation.
Proof. Let F be an aggregation rule satisfying these conditions, with regular rationality-
preserving revision. We show unanimity-preservation. By systematicity, it su¢ces to
show that N is a winning coalition and ? is a losing coalition.
Claim 1: The full coalition N is winning.
Consider any rational profile hJ1, ..., Jni 2 J n and any p contained in all Ji. We
must show that F (J1, . . . , Jn) contains p. As revision is conservative, hJ1|p, ..., Jn|pi =
hJ1, ..., Jni. So, by dynamic rationality, F (J1, . . . , Jn)|p = F (J1, . . . , Jn). The left side
contains p by successfulness of revision. So F (J1, . . . , Jn) contains p. Q.e.d.
Claim 2: There is a non-tautological p 2 X and a profile hJ1, ..., Jni 2 J n such that
p 62 F (J1, ..., Jn).
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By non-absurdity, there is a p 2 X and a profile hJ1, ..., Jni 2 J n such that p 62
F (J1, ..., Jn). Assume for a contradiction that p is tautological. Then p belongs to all
Ji. So hJ1, ..., Jni = hJ1|p, ..., Jn|pi, as revision is conservative. Hence, by dynamic
rationality F (J1, . . . , Jn)|p = F (J1, . . . , Jn). Noting that p 2 F (J1, . . . , Jn)|p (as revision
is successful), it follows that p 2 F (J1, ..., Jn), a contradiction. Q.e.d.
Claim 3: The empty coalition ? is not winning.
Pick p and hJ1, ..., Jni as in Claim 2. As p is non-tautological, there is a rational
profile J 2 J such that p 62 J . Since p 62 F (J1, ..., Jn), and since each individual
accepting p in the profile hJ, ..., Ji 2 J n (namely, no-one) accepts p in hJ1, ..., Jni, we
have p 62 F (J, ..., J), by monotonicity. So the empty coalition ? (= {i : p 2 Ji}) is not
winning. !
Proof of Theorem 2. Let X be non-simple. For a contradiction, assume F is an aggre-
gation rule satisfying all mentioned conditions, with dynamic consistency defined with
respect to a given regular rationality-preserving revision operator. By Lemmas 1 and 2,
F is unanimity-preserving and guarantees weak consistency.
By non-simplicity, we may pick a minimal inconsistent set Y ⊆ X with |Y | ≥ 3.
For each y 2 Y , fix a J¬y 2 J such that Y \{y} ⊆ J¬y. Pick a p 2 Y . Since J¬p|p
cannot contain all y 2 Y (as revision preserves rationality) but contains p (as revision
is successful), there is some q 2 Y \{p} such that q 62 J¬p|p. As |Y | ≥ 3, we may pick a
third proposition r 2 Y \{p, q}.
By systematicity, F is given by its winning coalitions. Note the following:
• N is winning while ? is not winning, by unanimity-preservation.
• Supersets of winning coalitions are winning, i.e., whenever C ⊆ N is winning, so
is any C 0 ⊆ N such that C ⊆ C 0. This follows from monotonicity.
• Any two winning coalitions C,C 0 have non-empty intersection. Otherwise N\C ⊇
C 0, so that N\C would be winning by monotonicity; but then we would have two
complementary winning coalitions (C and N\C), which would contradict weak
consistency.
• There exist at least two minimal winning coalitions. Otherwise the set of winning
coalitions would be a filter over N , implying oligarchy.
Pick two distinct minimal winning coalition C and C 0. Construct a profile hJ1, ..., Jni 2





J¬p if i 2 N\C
J¬q if i 2 C\C 0
J¬r if i 2 C \ C 0.
As p and q are accepted by winning coalitions (namely by C and by N\(C\C 0) ⊇ C 0,
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respectively), p, q 2 F (J1, ..., Jn). Consider the revised profile hJ1|p, ..., Jn|pi. As q 62
J¬p|p and as (by conservativeness of revision) J¬q|p = J¬q and J¬r|p = J¬r, in the new
profile q is accepted only by those individuals who used to submit J¬r, hence by the
coalition C \ C 0. This coalition is not winning because (as C \ C 0 6= ?) it is a strict
subset of a minimal winning coalition (i.e., of C or C 0). So q 62 F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p). Now,
F (J1, ..., Jn) equals F (J1, ..., Jn)|p (as it contains p and as revision is conservative) and
it di§ers from F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) because it contains q while F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) does not.
Therefore, F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) 6= F (J1, ..., Jn)|p. !
B Proof of the possibility claims in Section 6
B.1 Possibilities without universal domain
In the main text, we have discussed two types of aggregation rules satisfying all conditions
in Theorem 2 except universal domain. The second type requires formal elaboration.
There, we consider a fixed linear order ≤ of the propositions, representing for instance a
political left-to-right order or the propositions. Recall that J≤ denotes the set of those
rational judgment sets J 2 J which are single-plateaued with respect to ≤, as defined
earlier. Recall also that the order ≤ induces a natural revision rule, as defined above.1
This revision operator is obviously regular and rationality-preserving. As long as n is
odd, majority rule restricted to J n≤ satisfies all aggregation conditions of Theorem 2
except universal domain. This is obvious for most aggregation conditions, but requires
a proof for dynamic rationality.
Proposition 2 If n is odd, majority rule on the restricted domain J n≤ is dynamically
rational with respect to the above revision operator.
Proof. Assume n is odd, F is majority rule on J n≤ , and revision is defined as above.
To prove dynamic rationality, consider any hJ1, ..., Jni 2 J n≤ and p 2 X such that
hJ1|p, ..., Jn|pi 2 J n≤ . For all J 2 J , write min J for J ’s minimal element with respect
to ≤. For simplicity, assume that i < j ) min Ji ≤ min Jj . Assuming this condition
is no loss of generality, because the condition can always be enforced by reordering the
profile appropriately (reordering makes no di§erence since majority rule is anonymous).
1Our above definition of J |p could be generalised slightly, as follows. If J 2 J≤ and some J 0 2 J≤
contains p (first bullet point), the definition of J |p remains unchanged. Otherwise (second bullet point),
J |p can be defined arbitrarily, only subject to respecting the regularity conditions that p 2 J |p and
that J |p = J if p 2 J , and the rationality-preservation condition that J |p 2 J if J 2 J and p is
non-contradictory. Our proof holds for this general definition.
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As the profile is single-plateaued and rational, it is unidimensionally aligned (see Di-
etrich and List 2010). Unidimensional alignment means that there exists a permutation
(i1, ..., in) of the individuals such that each proposition q 2 X is accepted either by a
‘left-segment’ of individuals (i.e., {i : q 2 Ji} = {i1, ..., ik} for some k 2 {0, ..., n}) or by a
‘right-segment’ of individuals (i.e., {i : q 2 Ji} = {ik, ..., in} for some k 2 {1, ..., n+ 1});
a consequence is that the majority judgment set is the judgment set of the median
individual, i.e.,
F (J1, ..., Jn) = Ji(n+1)/2
(List 2003). A permutation (i1, ..., in) with the mentioned property is called a structuring
order, and the profile hJ1, ..., Jni is more explicitly called unidimensionally aligned ‘with
respect to (i1, ..., in)’. Our initial assumption on the order of the judgment sets in
hJ1, ..., Jni yields a natural structuring order:
Claim 1: hJ1, ..., Jni is unidimensionally aligned with respect to the structuring order
(1, ..., n). In particular,
F (J1, ..., Jn) = J(n+1)/2. (1)
Write X = {p1, ..., p|X|} where p1 < p2 < · · · < p|X|. Consider any q 2 X. There are
two cases.
• Case 1: q 2 {p1, ..., p|X|/2}, i.e., q is ‘more to the left’. We show that {i : q 2
Ji} = {1, ..., k} for some k 2 {0, ..., n}. To prove this, we consider an individual i
such that q 2 Ji, and show for any given other individual j < i that again q 2 Jj .
This follows from three facts. First, min Jj ≤ q, because min Jj ≤ min Ji (as
j < i) and min Ji ≤ p (as p 2 Ji). Second, q ≤ maxJj , because Jj contains
|X|
2
propositions (by rationality) while there are less than |X|2 propositions to the left
of q (as q 2 {p1, ..., p|X|/2}). Third, Jj is an ‘interval’ or ‘plateau’, i.e., contains all
propositions between min Jj and maxJj , by single-plateauedness.
• Case 2: q 2 {p|X|/2+1, ..., p|X|}, i.e., q is ‘more to the right’). We show that
{i : q 2 Ji} = {k, ..., n} for some k 2 {1, ..., n + 1}. To this end, we consider an
individual i such that q 2 Ji, and show for any other individual j > i that again
q 2 Jj . This holds because, for reasons analogous to those in Case 1, q ≤ maxJj ,
min Jj ≤ q, and Jj is an ‘interval’. Q.e.d.
Claim 2: The set J≤,p := {J 2 J≤ : p 2 J} is non-empty.
Recall that hJ1|p, ..., Jn|pi 2 J n≤ and each Ji|p contains p. So, hJ1|p, ..., Jn|pi 2 J
n
≤,p,
whence J≤,p 6= ?. Q.e.d.
Claim 3: The revised judgment profile is
(J1|p, ..., Jn|p) =
(
(J1, ..., Jk, J, ..., J) if p 2 {p1, ..., p|X|/2}
(J 0, ..., J 0, Jk0 , ..., Jn) if p 2 {p|X|/2+1, ..., p|X|}
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where
• k = max{i : p 2 Ji}, interpreted as 0 if {i : p 2 Ji} = ?,
• J is the right-most judgment set in J≤,p (6= ?), i.e., J 2 J≤,p and min J̃ ≤ min J
for all J̃ 2 J≤,p,
• k0 = min{i : p 2 Ji}, interpreted as n+ 1 if {i : p 2 Ji} = ?,
• J 0 is the left-most judgment set in J≤,p (6= ?), i.e., J 0 2 J≤,p and min J 0 ≤ min J̃
for all J̃ 2 J≤,p.
This claim follows from the definition of the revision operator and the fact that in
the profile hJ1, ..., Jni the judgment sets are ordered such that i < j ) min Ji ≤ min Jj .
For instance, assume p 2 {p1, ..., p|X|/2}. Then no judgment set Ji is ‘to the left’ of p
(as |Ji| = |X| /2). Those Ji which already contain p are unchanged: Ji|p = Ji. Those Ji
which do not contain p lie ‘to the right’ of p, so that their revision ‘shifts’ them minimally
to the left such that p is accepted: Ji|p = J . Q.e.d.
Claim 4: hJ1|p, ..., Jn|pi is again unidimensionally aligned with respect to the struc-
turing (1, ..., n). In particular,
F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) = J(n+1)/2|p. (2)
Claim 3 implies that the judgment sets in the revised profile hJ1|p, ..., Jn|pi have the
analogous property to that of in the original profile: i < j ) min(Ji|p) ≤ min(Jj |p). So,
by an argument analogous to that used to prove Claim 1, hJ1|p, ..., Jn|pi is a unidimen-
sionally aligned profile with structuring order (1, ..., n). Q.e.d.
By (1) in Claim 1 and (2) in Claim 4, F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) = F (J1, ..., Jn)|p. !
B.2 Possibilities without non-imposition
As noted, there is a single aggregation rule satisfying all conditions of Theorem 2 except
non-imposition: the absurd rule, which maps each hJ1, ..., Jni 2 J n to the judgment
set F (J1, ..., Jn) = X. The absurd rule obviously satisfies all other conditions. In
particular, dynamic rationality is trivially satisfied with respect to any conservative
revision operator, because conservativeness prevents the collective from ever revising its
degenerate judgment set J = X.
But why do other constant aggregation rules on J n fail to satisfy all other conditions?
While this fact already follows from our proof in Appendix A.2, let us now give an
intuition. Consider a constant rule on J n which always generates some given judgment
set J 6= X. Pick a p 2 X\J , and let p be contingent for the sake of this illustration.
Since p is collectively rejected regardless of which individuals accept p, no coalition
whatsoever is winning for p. Therefore, supposing systematicity, no coalition is winning
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for any proposition in X. So no proposition is ever collectively accepted: J = ?. But
then dynamic rationality fails, because whenever the individuals learn some (contingent)
proposition p, then the revised judgment profile still aggregates into J = ?, although
dynamic rationality would have required the collective to come to acquire the judgment
set ?|p, which contains p, assuming revision is successful.
B.3 Possibilities without monotonicity
In identifying a non-monotonic escape route, we have limited attention to agendas with
two structural properties, and introduced a particular revision operator for such agendas.
We have claimed that these revision operators obey our requirements, and that so-called
parity rules satisfy all conditions of Theorem 2 except monotonicity. Both claims are
now established formally.
Proposition 3 For agendas with both properties, the revision operator defined earlier
is regular and rationality-preserving.
Proof. Let X satisfy both conditions. The relevant revision operator is obviously regular.
To show that it preserves rationality, assume J is rational and p is non-contradictory.
We must show that J |p is rational. This is obvious if p 2 J , as then J |p = J . Henceforth
let p 62 J . So J |p = (Xp\J)[ (J\Xp), where ‘Xp’ is the earlier-defined subagenda. Since
J contains exactly one member of each pair q,¬q 2 X, so does J |p. It thus remains to
show that J |p is consistent. For a contradiction, let J |p be inconsistent. Pick a minimal
inconsistent subset Y of J |p. Noting that p is contingent (it is non-contradictory by
assumption and non-tautological by p 62 J), it follows that |Y \Xp| 2 {0, 2, 4, ...}. So,
since X is a¢ne (i.e., not pair-negatable), the set Y 0 arising from Y by negating the
members of Y \ Xp is again inconsistent. So, as Y 0 ⊆ J , also J is inconsistent, a
contradiction. !
Proposition 4 If the agenda X has both properties (and contains at least one contingent
proposition, e.g., is non-simple), then all parity rules with |M | 6= 1 satisfy each condition
of the theorem except monotonicity.
Proof. Let X be as specified. Consider the parity rule F whose (odd-sized) subgroup
M ⊆ N satisfies |M | 6= 1. Clearly, F is universal, non-oligarchic, non-constant, sys-
tematic, and non-monotonic, where non-oligarchy and non-monotonicity hold because
|M | 6= 1 (and because X contains a contingent proposition). To prove dynamic ratio-
nality, consider a profile hJ1, ..., Jni 2 J n and a p 2 X such that hJ1|p, ..., Jn|pi 2 J n (p
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is non-contradictory because J1|p is rational and contains p). We fix a q 2 X and must
show that
q 2 F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p), q 2 F (J1, ..., Jn)|p. (3)
Note that F (J1, ..., Jn) 2 J since parity rules guarantee rationality for a¢ne, i.e., non-
pair-negatable, agendas (Dokow and Holzman 2010).
Case 1 : q 2 X\Xp. Then, as J1, ..., Jn are rational, by definition of revision we have
q 2 Ji , q 2 Ji|p for i = 1, ..., n,
which by independence of parity rules implies
q 2 F (J1, ..., Jn), q 2 F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p).
Analogously, as F (J1, ..., Jn) is rational, by definition of revision we have
q 2 F (J1, ..., Jn), q 2 F (J1, ..., Jn)|p.
These two equivalences together imply (3).
Case 2 : q 2 Xp. By definition of revision, for all i 2M , as Ji 2 J ,
q 2 Ji|p,
(
q 2 Ji if p 2 Ji
q 62 Ji if p 62 Ji,
(4)
and analogously, as F (J1, ..., Jn) 2 J ,
q 2 F (J1, ..., Jn)|p,
(
q 2 F (J1, ..., Jn) if p 2 F (J1, ..., Jn)
q 62 F (J1, ..., Jn) if p 62 F (J1, ..., Jn).
(5)
It will prove useful to prove a simple combinatorial fact:
finite sets S and S0 have same parity if and only if
∣∣S M S0
∣∣ is even. (6)
Here, the parity of a set is ‘even’ or ‘odd’, depending on whether its cardinality is even
or odd, and S M S0 denotes the symmetric di§erence (S\S0) [ (S0\S). The equivalence
(6) holds because, for any finite sets S and S0, firstly S and S0 have same parity if and
















For all r 2 X, let Mr := {i 2M : r 2 Ji} and M 0r = {i 2M : r 2 Ji|p}. By (4),
Mq MM 0q =M\Mp. (7)
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We consider two subcases.
Subcase 2.1 : |Mp| is odd. Then, by definition of parity rules, p 2 F (J1, ..., Jn), so
that by (5)
q 2 F (J1, ..., Jn)|p, q 2 F (J1, ..., Jn). (8)
As |M | and |Mp| are odd, |M\Mp| (= |M |− |Mp|) is even. Hence, by (7),
∣∣Mq MM 0q
∣∣ is
even, so that by (6) Mq and M 0q have same parity. Thus, by definition of parity rules,
q 2 F (J1, ..., Jn), q 2 F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p).
This equivalence and the equivalence (8) imply (3).
Subcase 2.2 : |Mp| is even. Then, firstly, p 62 F (J1, ..., Jn), so that by (5)
q 2 F (J1, ..., Jn)|p, q 62 F (J1, ..., Jn). (9)
As |M | is odd and |Mp| is even, |M\Mp| (= |M |−|Mp|) is odd. Hence, by (7),
∣∣Mq MM 0q
∣∣
is odd, and so by (6) Mq and M 0q have opposed parity. Therefore, by definition of parity
rules,
q 62 F (J1, ..., Jn), q 2 F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p).
Combining this equivalence with (9), we again obtain (3). !
B.4 Possibilities without non-oligarchy
We have specified two types of aggregation rule that satisfy all conditions of Theorem
2 except non-oligarchy. The first of these oligarchic escape routes are trivial: they are
the dictatorships. We here focus on the second, less trivial, oligarchic possibility. This
possibility was restricted to a special agenda (of the form X = {±p1,±p2,±p3} with
certain logical interconnections) and a special revision operator, as defined above. We
now formally establish that this revision operator indeed has the desirable properties, and
that oligarchies become dynamically rational (they obviously satisfy the other conditions
in Theorem 2 except non-oligarchy).
The sets Jp 2 J (for p 2 X and J 2 J ) are defined as before, and J + ⊆ J still
denotes the set of consistent and deductively closed judgment sets. Recall that for all
J 2 J +
J |p = \J 02J :J⊆J 0J 0p, (10)
which in the special case of a rational J 2 J implies
J |p = Jp if J 2 J . (11)
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Proposition 5 The specified revision operator for the special agenda X is regular and
rationality-preserving.
Proof. Revision is rationality-preserving by definition. To show that revision is success-
ful, consider any p 2 X and J ⊆ X. We show that p 2 J |p. If J 62 J +, then p 2 J |p by
assumption. If J 2 J +, then p 2 J |p because in (10) each J 0p contains p.
To finally show that revision is conservative, consider any p 2 J ⊆ X. We prove
that J |p = J . If p 62 J +, then this again holds by assumption. If J 2 J +, then it holds
because
J |p = \J 02J :J⊆J 0J 0p = \J 02J :J⊆J 0J
0 = J,
where the first equality holds by definition of J |p, the second because each J 0p equals J 0
(as p 2 J 0), and the third by Lemma 3 below. !
The following is a general logical fact about deductively closed judgment sets, which
does not depend on our specific agenda.
Lemma 3 For an arbitrary agenda X, the consistent and deductively closed judgment
sets are the intersections of one or more rational judgments:
J + = {\J2SJ : S ⊆ J , S 6= ?}.
In particular, each H 2 J + is the intersection of its rational extensions:
H = \J2J :H⊆JJ.
Proof. First, any intersection \J2SJ with S ⊆ J is deductively closed, and if S 6= ?
also consistent, hence in J +. Conversely, consider any H 2 J + and define S = {J 2
J : H ⊆ J}. As H is consistent, S 6= ?. We show H = \J2SJ . Clearly, H ⊆ \J2SJ .
To see why \J2SJ ⊆ H, note that an p 2 \J2SJ is entailed by H, hence belongs to H
by deductive closure. !
The following lemma tells us which judgment sets are consistent and deductively
closed for our specific agenda:
Lemma 4 For the special agenda X, the set of consistent and deductively closed judg-
ment sets is
J + = J [ {{p} : p 2 X} [ {?}.
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Proof. Consider the given agenda. First, J [ {{p} : p 2 X} [ {?} ⊆ J +, since
each rational or singleton or empty judgment set is consistent and moreover deductively
closed, for agenda in question. Conversely, consider a judgment set H 62 J [ {{p} : p 2
X} [ {?}. We show that H 62 J +. We can exclude that H contains both members
of some issue {±pk}, as otherwise H is obviously inconsistent, hence outside J +. As
H 62 J [ {{p} : p 2 X} [ {?}, the number of issues with which H intersects (defined
by |{k 2: H \ {±pk} 6= ?}|) is not 3, not 1, and not 0. So that number is 2, i.e., H is a
two-proposition set. Thus H is not deductively closed, since any two-proposition subset
of X entails a third proposition from the remaining issue (e.g., {p1, p2} entails p3, and
{p1,¬p2} entails ¬p3). Hence, H 62 J +. !
Proposition 6 For the special agenda X, every oligarchy is dynamically rational with
respect to the above revision operator.
Proof. Consider the given agenda X and revision operator. Let F be an oligarchy, with
set of oligarchsM (6= ?). To prove dynamic rationality, let hJ1, ..., Jni 2 J n and p 2 X.
We show that F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) = F (J1, ..., Jn)|p, i.e., that
\i2M (Ji|p) = (\i2MJi)|p.
On the left, each Ji|p reduces to (Ji)p by (11), as Ji 2 J . On the right, (\i2MJi)|p
reduces to \J2J :\i2MJi⊆JJp by (10), as \i2MJi 2 J
+ by Lemma 3. So we must show
that
\i2M (Ji)p = \J2J :\i2MJi⊆JJp. (12)
By Lemmas 3 and 4, \i2MJi belongs to J + = J [ {{q} : q 2 X} [ {?}. This leads to
three cases.
Case 1 : \i2MJi 2 J . Here all Ji (i 2 M) coincide, say with J∗ 2 J . Hence (12)
holds, since both sides equal J∗p .
Case 2 : \i2MJi = {q} for some q 2 X. Here the sets Ji (i 2 M) are rational
extensions of {q}, but not all same one extension. So, since {q} has just two rational
extensions, the sets Ji (i 2M) include all rational extensions of {q}; formally, {Ji : i 2
M} = {J 2 J : {q} ⊆ J}. So each side of (12) equals \J2J :{q}⊆JJp, proving (12).
Case 3 : \i2MJi = ?. To establish (12), we prove that both sides equal {p}. The
right side of (12) reduces to \J2J Jp, which equals {p} by definition of the sets Jp
(J 2 J ). We must show that also the left side equals {p}. Note that \i2M (Ji)p ⊇ {p},
since each (Ji)p contains p. To prove that \i2M (Ji)p ⊆ {p}, we call J 0 and J 00 the two
rational extensions of {p}, and distinguish between three subcases.
Subcase 3.1 : J 0 and J 00 are among the sets Ji (i 2M). Then
\i2M (Ji)p ⊆ J 0p \ J
00
p = J
0 \ J 00 = {p},
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where the second equality holds because J 0p = J
0 (as p 2 J 0) and J 00p = J 00 (as p 2 J 00).
So \i2M (Ji)p ⊆ {p}.
Subcase 3.2 : Exactly one of J 0 and J 00 is among the sets Ji (i 2M). Without loss of
generality, let J 0 but not J 00 be among these sets, and let p = p1, J 0 = {p1, p2, p3}, and
J 00 = {p1,¬p2,¬p3} (other cases are handled analogously). Since \i2MJi = ?, among
the sets Ji (i 2 M) there are sets Ĵ and J̃ such that p2 62 Ĵ and p3 62 J̃ . These two
sets cannot contain p; otherwise they would be rational extensions of {p}, so that J 0
would not be the only rational extension of {p} among the sets Ji (i 2 M). Moreover,
Ĵ 6= J̃ ; otherwise both sets would equal {p1,¬p2,¬p3} = J 00, so that J 00 would be among
the sets Ji (i 2 M). These two facts imply that Ĵp 6= J̃p, by construction of the sets
Jp (J 2 J ). Since Ĵp and J̃p are distinct rational extensions of {p}, Ĵp \ J̃p = {p}.
Meanwhile \i2M (Ji)p ⊆ Ĵp \ J̃p. So \i2M (Ji)p ⊆ {p}.
Subcase 3.3 : Neither J 0 nor J 00 is among the sets Ji (i 2 M). This subcase is in
fact impossible, because it would imply that all Ji (i 2 M) are extensions of {¬p},
contradicting that \i2MJi = ?. !
B.5 Possibilities without systematicity
We have defined a non-systematic escape route, in the form of a particular asymmetric
unanimity rule. To make the rule dynamically rational, we have assumed a special non-
simple agenda X and an equally special revision operator. We now establish that the
revision operator has the desired properties, and that the rule is indeed dynamically
rational with respect to it; the rule obviously satisfies all other conditions of Theorem 2
except systematicity, in fact except the neutrality part of systematicity.
Proposition 7 For the given non-simple agenda, the specified revision operator is reg-
ular and rationality-preserving.
Proof. Assume this agenda X. Revision is obviously regular. To see that revision
preserves rationality, consider any rational J and any p 2 X. J |p is complete because Y
contains a member of each pair {±q} ⊆ X. J |p is consistent because it includes neither
Y , nor any pair {±q}, hence includes no minimal inconsistent set. !
Proposition 8 For the given non-simple agenda, the specified asymmetric unanimity
rule is dynamically rational with respect to the given revision operator.
Proof. Consider the given agenda, revision operator, and aggregation rule. To ver-
ify dynamic rationality, consider any hJ1, ..., Jni 2 J n and any p 2 X such that
hJ1|p, ..., Jn|pi 2 J n (in fact, membership of hJ1|p, ..., Jn|pi in J n already follows from
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the fact that X contains no contradictory proposition and revision preserves rationality).
We distinguish between three cases:
• Case 1: p 2 Y and p 2 J1, ..., Jn. Then p 2 F (J1, ..., Jn). By conservativeness, nei-
ther any of J1, ..., Jn nor F (J1, ..., Jn) changes by learning p. So F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) =
F (J1, ..., Jn)|p.
• Case 2: p 2 Y and p 62 Ji for some i. Since all of J1|p, ..., Jn|p contain p by success-
fulness, and since Ji|p contains ¬y for all y 2 Y \{p}, we have F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) =
{p}[{¬y : y 2 Y \{p}}. Meanwhile, as p 2 Y and p 62 Ji, we have p 62 F (J1, ..., Jn),
so that F (J1, ..., Jn)|p = {p}[{¬y : y 2 Y \{p}}. So, F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) = F (J1, ..., Jn)|p.
• Case 3: p 62 Y . Then the revised profile hJ1|p, ..., Jn|pi displays unanimous ac-
ceptance of p and (as p 62 Y ) coincides with the initial profile hJ1, ..., Jni outside
the issue {±p}. So, F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) contains p and coincides with F (J1, ..., Jn)
outside {±p}. Also F (J1, ..., Jn)|p contains p and (because p 62 Y ) coincides with
F (J1, ..., Jn) outside {±p}. Hence, F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) = F (J1, ..., Jn)|p. !
B.6 Possibilities for simple agendas
If the agenda is simple, then plenty of aggregation rules satisfy the conditions of the
theorem, in the case of dynamic rationality assuming a particular revision operator
defined above. This result was stated as ‘Proposition 1’. We now show first that this
revision operator satisfies our desiderata, and then that Proposition 1 holds. Notation
is as above.
Proposition 9 The specified revision operator is regular, and for a simple agenda also
rationality-preserving.
Proof. Consider the specified revision operator. Let J ⊆ X and p 2 J . If J 62 J , then
regularity applied to J and p holds by stipulation, and rationality preservation applied
to J and p holds vacuously. Now suppose J 2 J . We must show three things.
1. (successfulness) We have to show that p 2 J |p. Note that J contains p or ¬p, as
J 2 J . In the first case, J |p contains pp, which equals p because {p, p} is consistent (as
J 2 J ). In the second case, J |p contains (¬p)p, which equals p as {¬p, p} is inconsistent.
So, in any case, p 2 J |p.
2. (conservativeness) If p 2 J , then J |p = J because for each q 2 J we have qp = q
(since {q, p} is consistent, being included in the rational judgment set J).
3. (rationality preservation) Assume X is simple. For a contradiction, let p be non-
contradictory and let J |p 62 J . Then J is inconsistent, hence has a minimal inconsistent
subset Y . By simplicity of X, |Y | ≤ 2, say Y = {qp, q0p} for some q, q0 2 J . By
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definition of qp and q0p (and by p’s non-contradictoriness), the sets {qp, p} and {q0p, p}
are consistent. Since {qp, p} is consistent and qp entails ¬q0p, also {¬q0p, p} is consistent.
Similarly, since {q0p, p} is consistent and q0p entails ¬qp, {¬qp, p} is consistent. Now, as
{qp, p} and {¬qp, p} are consistent, qp = q by definition. Analogously, as {q0p, p} and
{¬q0p, p} are consistent, q0p = q0. So, {qp, q0p} = {q, q0}, a subset of the consistent set J .
This contradicts the inconsistency of {qp, q0p}. !
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a simple agenda X, a unanimity-preserving inde-
pendent rule F : J n ! J , and the revision operator defined above. To prove dy-
namic rationality, consider a profile hJ1, ..., Jni 2 J n and a learnt proposition p 2 X
such that hJ1|p, ..., Jn|pi 2 J n (i.e., such that p is non-contradictory). To prove that
F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) = F (J1, ..., Jn)|p, we fix a q 2 X and show that F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) and
F (J1, ..., Jn)|p coincide on q. We distinguish between three cases.
• Case 1 : {q, p} and {¬q, p} are both consistent. Then J |p coincides with J on
q for all J 2 J . In particular, Ji|p coincides with Ji on q for all i, and hence
(by independence) F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) coincides with F (J1, ..., Jn) on q. Meanwhile
F (J1, ..., Jn)|p also coincides with F (J1, ..., Jn) on q. So, F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) coincides
with F (J1, ..., Jn)|p on q.
• Case 2 : {q, p} is consistent and {¬q, p} is inconsistent. Then q 2 J |p for all J 2 J .
In particular, q 2 Ji|p for all i, whence by unanimity preservation and independence
q 2 F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p). Meanwhile q 2 F (J1, ..., Jn)|p. So F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) and
F (J1, ..., Jn)|p coincide on q.
• Case 3 : {q, p} is inconsistent and {¬q, p} is consistent. Then ¬q 2 J |p for all
J 2 J . In particular, ¬q 2 Ji|p for all i, whence by unanimity preservation
and independence ¬q 2 F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p). Meanwhile ¬q 2 F (J1, ..., Jn)|p. So
F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) and F (J1, ..., Jn)|p coincide on ¬q, hence on q. !
C Proof of both possibility theorems
We now prove both possibility theorems about premise-based aggregation and revision.
All definitions and notation apply. In particular, recall that
• any premise subagenda Xprem induces a conclusion subagenda Xconc = X\Xprem,
a set of premise issues Zprem ⊆ Z, and a set of conclusion issues Zconc ⊆ Z,
• any premise subagenda Xprem, premise aggregators (FZ)Z2Zprem , and consequence
rule Cn jointly induce a premise-based rule F on bJ n,
• any premise subagenda Xprem, premise revisors (|Z)Z2Zprem , and consequence rule
Cn jointly induce a premise-based revision operator.
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C.1 Theorem 3
To prove Theorem 3, fix a proper (premise) subagenda Xprem, a consequence rule Cn,
and an idempotent premise-based revision operator. Let F : bJ n ! bJ be a premise-
based rule with unanimity-preserving premise aggregators FZ : J nZ ! JZ (Z 2 Zprem).
To show that F is dynamically rational, consider any profile hJ1, ..., Jni 2 bJ n and learnt
proposition p 2 X such that hJ1|p, ..., Jn|pi 2 bJ n. We must show that F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) =
F (J1, ..., Jn)|p. This is done by proving that, for all issues Z 2 Z,
F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) \ Z = [F (J1, ..., Jn)|p] \ Z. (13)
Claim 1: Equation (13) holds for all premise issues Z 2 Zprem.
Consider any Z 2 Zprem. For each individual i, let qi be the single member of Ji\Z.
Also, let q0 be the single member of FZ(J1 \ Z, ..., Jn \ Z). Then,
FZ({q1}, ..., {qn}) = {q0}. (14)
The left side of the desired equation (13) is rewritable as follows:
F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) \ Z = FZ((J1|p) \ Z, ..., (Jn|p) \ Z)
= FZ({q1}|Zp, ..., {qn}|Zp),
where the first and second equation holds by definition of premise-based aggregation and
revision, respectively. Meanwhile the right side of the desired equation equals {q0}|Zp,
by definition of premise-based revision. So the desired equation reduces to
FZ({q1}|Zp, ..., {qn}|Zp) = {q0}|Zp. (15)
In other words, we must show that FZ is (in the obvious sense) dynamically rational at
the local profile ({q1}, ..., {qn}) and the learnt proposition p. There are two cases:
• Case 1 : learning p does not lead to revision of any judgments on Z, i.e., {q}|Zp =
{q} for each {q} 2 JZ . Then the desired equation (15) reduces to the known
equation (14), hence is true.
• Case 2 : learning p leads to revision of some judgment on Z, i.e., there is a {q} 2 JZ
such that {q}|Zp 6= {q}.
— Subcase 2.1 : {q}|Zp 2 JZ . Here, as {q}|Zp 6= {q}, we must have {q}|Zp =
{¬q}, and thus, by idempotence of revision, {¬q}|Zp = {¬q}. So the desired
equation (15) reduces to
FZ({¬q}, ..., {¬q}) = {¬q},
which holds because FZ preserves unanimity.
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— Subcase 2.2 : {q}|Zp 62 JZ . Recall that, by assumption, for each individual i
we have Ji|p 2 bJ ; hence {qi}|Zp 2 JZ , which (because {q}|Zp 62 JZ) implies
that qi 6= q. So, qi = ¬q. Hence, by (14), FZ({¬q}, ..., {¬q}) = {q0}. By
unanimity preservation it follows that q0 = ¬q. Hence the desired equation
(15) reduces to
FZ({¬q}|Zp, ..., {¬q}|Zp) = {¬q}|Zp,
which holds because FZ preserves unanimity. (In fact, {¬q}|Zp must equal
{¬q}; otherwise {¬q}|Zp would equal {q}, whence ({¬q}|Zp)|Zp = {q}|Zp 6=
{¬q}, contradicting idempotence.)
Claim 2: Equation (13) holds for all conclusion issues Z 2 Zconc.
Consider any Z 2 Zconc. By definition of premise-based aggregation, the left side of
the desired equation (15) equals
Cn([Z02Zprem [F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) \ Z
0]) \ Z,
while by definition of premise-based revision the right side of the desired equation equals
Cn([Z02Zprem [F (J1, ..., Jn)|p \ Z
0]) \ Z.
So the desired equation becomes
Cn([Z02Zprem [F (J1|p, ..., Jn|p) \ Z
0]) \ Z = Cn([Z02Zprem [F (J1, ..., Jn)|p \ Z
0]) \ Z.
This holds by Claim 1. !
C.2 Theorem 4
To prove Theorem 4, we consider a premise-based revision operator, given by a premise
subagenda Xprem, a consequence rule Cn, and premise revisors (|Z)Z2Zprem . We assume
revision is idempotent, and regular on premises.
Part 1. First consider a premise-based rule F . It obviously maps from bJ n to bJ . By
Theorem 3, it is dynamically rational, provided its premise aggregators FZ preserve una-
nimity. It is independent of irrelevant propositions, because the collective judgment on
a proposition p 2 X is entirely fixed by the individual judgments on the relevant propo-
sition (in R(p)), whether p is a premise or a conclusion, as is clear from the definition or
premise-based rules. Finally, provided each FZ is monotonic, F is globally monotonic,
by the following argument: if in a profile in bJ n one replaces someone’s judgment set
by the collective judgment set, then that individual’s judgment on each premise issue
Z 2 Zprem is replaced by the collective judgment on Z, which by monotonicity of each
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FZ (Z 2 Zprem) has no e§ect on collective judgments on premises, and thus has no e§ect
on conclusions either since aggregation is premise-based.
Part 2. Conversely, assume F : bJ n ! bJ is a dynamically rational aggregation rule
that is independent of irrelevant propositions and globally monotonic. Let G be the
premise-based rule whose premise aggregators FZ : J nZ ! JZ (Z 2 Zprem) are defined
as follows. For any premise issue Z 2 Zprem and any local profile (L1, ..., Ln) 2 J nZ ,
let FZ(L1, ..., Ln) = F (J1, ..., Jn) \ Z for some (hence, by independence of irrelevant
propositions, any) profile hJ1, ..., Jni 2 bJ n such that L1 ⊆ J1, ..., Ln ⊆ Jn. Since F
maps into bJ , each FZ indeed maps into JZ .
We must prove that F = G and that each FZ is unanimity-preserving and monotonic.
Claim 1. F = G.
Fix a profile hJ1, ..., Jni 2 bJ n and write JF := F (J1, ..., Jn) and JG := G(J1, ..., Jn).
We prove that JF = JG by showing that, for all issues Z 2 Z,
JF \ Z = JG \ Z. (16)
Firstly, equation (16) holds for all premise issues Z 2 Zprem, because each side then
equals FZ(J1 \ Z, ..., Jn \ Z). Now fix a conclusion issues Z 2 Zconc. By definition of
premise-based rules,
JG \ Z = Cn([Z02Zprem (JG \ Z
0)) \ Z. (17)
Turning to JF , and using repeatedly that F is globally monotonic,
JF = F (J1, ..., Jn)
= F (JF , J2, ..., Jn)
= F (JF , JF , J3, ..., Jn)
· · ·
= F (JF , ..., JF ),
where we have used in each step that the new profile still lies in the domain of F
since JF 2 bJ . Now pick any p 2 JF \ Xprem (noting that JF \ Xprem 6= ? because
JF 2 bJ ). Now JF \Xprem = JF |p \Xprem, since revision is conservative on premises.
So, since F is independent of irrelevant propositions (and only premises are relevant to
any propositions),
F (JF , ..., JF ) = F (JF |p, ..., JF |p) = F (JF , ..., JF )|p.
44
where the second equality holds by dynamic rationality. Therefore, since JF = F (JF , ..., JF ),
we have shown that JF = JF |p. Meanwhile, since revision is premise-based,
(JF |p) \ Z = Cn([Z02Zprem ((JF |p) \ Z
0) \ Z.
Replacing JF |p by JF , we obtain
JF \ Z = Cn([Z02Zprem (JF \ Z
0) \ Z. (18)
By (17), (18), and Claim 1, we can deduce (16). Q.e.d.
Claim 2. Each premise aggregator FZ (Z 2 Zprem) preserves unanimity.
Consider any Z 2 Zprem and any unanimous local profile (L, ..., L) 2 J nZ , say L =
{p}. We must show that FZ(L, ..., L) = L, or equivalently (as FZ(L, ..., L) belongs to JZ
and is thus singleton) that p 2 FZ(L, ..., L). Choose any extension J ⊇ L in bJ . Since
revision is conservative on premises, (J |p) \Xprem = J \Xprem. Hence, not just J , but
also J |p is a member of bJ that extends L. So, FZ(L, ..., L) equals F (J |p, ..., J |p) \ Z,
which equals F (J, ..., J)|p by dynamic rationality. As revision is successful on premises,
p belongs to F (J, ..., J)|p, hence to FZ(L, ..., L). Q.e.d.
Claim 3. Each premise aggregator FZ (Z 2 Zprem) is monotonic.
The argument is simple. Consider any FZ (Z 2 Zprem) and any local profile (L1, ..., Ln) 2
J nZ . Note that ordinary and global monotonicity are equivalent given the local nature
of the agenda (and the fact that FZ maps into the same set JZ to which also individual
judgment sets belong, so that we can substitute collective for individual judgment sets
without leaving the domain of FZ). So let us show global monotonicity of FZ . Let
(L1, ..., L, ..., Ln) arise from (L1, ..., Ln) by replacing some individual i’s judgment set
Li by L = FZ(L1, ..., Ln). We must show that F (L1, ..., L, ..., Ln) = L. Pick extensions
J1 ⊇ L1, ..., Jn ⊇ Ln in bJ . Define J = F (J1, ..., Jn). Note that L = J \Z, and so L ⊆ J .
Now
L = FZ(L1, ..., Ln)
= F (J1, ..., Jn) \ Z as L1 ⊆ J1, ..., Ln ⊆ Jn
= F (J1, ..., J, ..., Jn) \ Z as F is monotonic
= FZ(L1, ..., L, ..., Ln) as L1 ⊆ J1, ..., L ⊆ J, ..., Ln ⊆ Jn. !
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